Location costs, product quality, and implicit franchise contracts by Haucap, Justus et al.
www.ssoar.info
Location costs, product quality, and implicit
franchise contracts
Haucap, Justus; Wey, Christian; Barmbold, Jens
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Haucap, J., Wey, C., & Barmbold, J. (1998). Location costs, product quality, and implicit franchise contracts.
(Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß
und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel, 98-8). Berlin:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-124989
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN
FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG
discussion papers
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
CENTER BERLIN
FS IV 98 - 8
Location Costs, Product Quality,
and Implicit Franchise Contracts
Justus Haucap*
Christian Wey**
Jens Barmbold*
* University of Saarland
** Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
September 1998
ISSN Nr. 0722 - 6748
Forschungsschwerpunkt
Marktprozeß und Unter-
nehmensentwicklung
Research Area
Market Processes and
Corporate Development
Zitierweise/Citation:
Justus Haucap, Christian Wey, Jens Barmbold, Location Costs,
Product Quality, and Implicit Franchise Contracts, Discussion Paper
FS IV 98 - 8, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 1998.
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH,
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Tel. (030) 2 54 91 - 0
ABSTRACT
Location Costs, Product Quality, and Implicit Franchise Contracts
by Justus Haucap, Christian Wey, Jens Barmbold*
In the literature on international trade, very little attention has been given to
informational asymmetries between firms and consumers with respect to product quality.
The few economic models that analyze the question of how asymmetric information
about product quality might affect trade flows treat product quality as exogenous. In
contrast, our model takes product quality as an endogenous variable, i.e. firms can
choose the quality they wish to produce. In this case, location costs can signal product
quality under certain conditions and thereby affect international trade flows. More
specifically, intra-industry trade in vertical differentiated experience goods can be
determined by information asymmetries about product quality.
                                         
* We would like to thank Andrzej Cieœlik, James Dunlevy, Jess Gaspar, Michel Ghertman,
Eckhard Janeba, Daniel Klein, Bertrand Quélin, Stephan Panther, Rudolf Richter, Dieter
Schmidtchen, Ilya Segal, Udo Schmidt-Mohr, Deepak Somaya, Willy Spanjers, Mirja Weiss, and
seminar participants at UC Berkeley, the 1997 Meeting of the European Economic Association in
Toulouse, the 1997 Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Berne, and the 1998 Meeting of the
American Economic Association in Chicago for useful discussion and comments on this work.
This paper was almost completely rewritten while Justus Haucap was a visiting scholar at the
Institute of Management, Innovation, and Organization (IMIO) at the Haas School of Business,
University of California, Berkeley, the hospitality of which is most gratefully acknowledged.
Moreover, Justus Haucap is grateful for financial support from the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) under grant Ri 15-2. Christian Wey acknowledges financial
support from the Rainer Horstmann Fellowship at Indiana University, Bloomington. This
research was also financially supported by the BMW AG.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Standortkosten, Produktqualität und implizite Franchiseverträge
In der internationalen Handelstheorie ist der Tatsache, daß die Konsumenten in vielen
Fällen nur unvollständige Information über die Produktqualität besitzen, kaum Rechnung
getragen worden. Die wenigen Arbeiten, die die Wirkungen asymmetrischer Information
zwischen Herstellern und Konsumenten auf den internationalen Handel untersuchen,
behandeln die Produktqualität als exogene Variable. Im Gegensatz hierzu wird in diesem
Beitrag Produktqualität als eine endogene Variable angesehen, die von den Unternehmen
gewählt werden kann. Es wird argumentiert, daß in diesem Fall die Standortkosten zur
Signalisierung der Produktqualität eines Unternehmens herangezogen werden können. Es
zeigt sich, daß unter bestimmten Bedingungen die geeignete Wahl von
standortspezifischen variable Kosten in Verbindung mit Standortaustrittskosten zu einem
Trenngleichgewicht führen kann, in dem an einem relativ teuren Standort
Hochqualitätsprodukte und an einem relativ billigen Standort Niedrigqualitätsprodukte
hergestellt werden. Aus diesen Überlegungen folgt, daß intra-industrieller Handel in
vertikal differenzierten Erfahrungsgütern durch Informationsasymmetrien über die
Produktqualität und internationalen Unterschieden in den spezifischen Standortkosten
erklärt werden kann. Aufgrund der Anreizwirkungen der Standortkostenstrukur auf die
Wahl der Produktqualität wird das Verhältnis zwischen Landesregierung und
Unternehmen als ein implizites Franchiseverhältnis interpretiert.
11. Introduction
Traditional international trade theory predicts that a country’s trading pattern is mainly
determined by two factors: (1) the composition of its factor endowments, and (2) the
intensity with which factors are required (see Jones and Neary, 1984). While government
interventions such as tariffs, quotas, subsidies, etc. have also been argued to affect the
volume and the structure of international trade, traditional models usually have assumed
markets to be perfect.
In sharp contrast, the literature on strategic trade policy as initiated by Brander and
Spencer (1985) and reviewed by Brander (1995) has started to analyze the effects of
trade policy under conditions of imperfect competition. As these models demonstrate,
government intervention may be beneficial for a country in some situations. What is
rather surprising in this context is the fact that potential effects of asymmetric
information have only been explored to a very limited extent - although we know at least
since the path breaking work of Stigler (1961) and Akerlof (1970) that markets with
even small informational asymmetries are qualitatively different from markets with
symmetric information. The few models that deal with trade policy under asymmetric
information almost exclusively focus on informational asymmetries either between firms
and the government (Brainard and Martimort, 1997) or between domestic firms and
foreign rivals (Collie and Hviid, 1993). Common to these models is the idea that
government intervention may be beneficial for a country as it can make an output
expansion of the home firm credible. Moreover, as Qiu (1994) has demonstrated, if
neither the domestic government nor a foreign rival can observe the firm’s costs, the
government can play a second role: By offering a separation inducing menu firms might
2eventually be enabled to signal their costs to a foreign rival.
Almost no attention has been given to informational asymmetries between firms and
consumers and the question of how these asymmetries may affect international trade.
Particular exceptions are the two models of W. Mayer (1984) and Bagwell and Staiger
(1989) both of which discuss a country’s optimal trade policy when (foreign) consumers
are uninformed about domestic product quality. As these models do, we will consider the
case of an experience good the quality of which is unknown to consumers.1 However,
our model differs in important respects. First, W. Mayer (1984) and Bagwell and Staiger
(1989) take product quality as exogenously given; once consumers know a product’s
quality any credibility problem is resolved. In contrast, we will treat quality as a choice
variable. That means, there is a moral hazard or commitment problem connected with
product quality. Second, W. Mayer (1984) assumes that the home country’s government
is informed about a product’s quality. In contrast, we will consider the case in which
even the government is uninformed about the firm’s type. The government is assumed
not to know more than any consumer. Similar to Bagwell and Staiger (1989) and Qiu
(1994) we will assume that neither the domestic government nor consumers know firm’s
production costs, although they know the distribution from which the type is drawn.
Basically, our model extents the recent work by Haucap, Wey & Barmbold (1997)
according to which rational consumers can use the „Made-in“ label as a signal for
                                                       
1
 The term „experience good“ was coined by Nelson (1970). According to his definition a product is
considered an experience good if its quality is not evident on inspection and costly to determine before
purchase. In contrast, goods the quality of which can be easily determined on inspection have been labeled
„search goods“ (see Nelson, 1970).
3product quality if countries differ in location specific costs and relocation is costly. In this
case, production at a high-cost location can credibly signal high-quality production while
production at a low-cost site indicates low product quality. However, while Haucap,
Wey & Barmbold (1997) take prices as given and do not account for differences in
production costs, our analysis will also derive a monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy
and allow for differences in production costs. Moreover, the focus of Haucap, Wey &
Barmbold (1997) is on the legal protection of „Made-in“ labels. In contrast, this paper
will concentrate on potential implications for international trade and FDI.
Our model is also related to work by Chiang and Masson (1988) and Chisik (1998) who
show that consumers may use country-of-origin labels in situations of adverse selection.
However, these models differ from ours in some important respects. Chiang and Masson
(1988) analyze a case in which country-of-origin effects are the result of consumers
statistically discriminating between goods on basis of the products’ country of origin. In
this model, consumers only know the average product quality produced by firms in a
certain country. Accordingly, consumers form their expectation about product quality
based on the product’s place of production. In contrast, our model provides a signaling
explanation for country-of-origin effects. Similarly, Chisik (1998) analyzes country-of-
origin effects in a signaling context. Nevertheless, his model is based on statistical
discrimination effects, and country-of-origin labels are only used as signals for product
quality when the signaling processing is noisy. In contrast, we consider a signaling
process without noise. Furthermore, in Chisik’s model high-quality producers have lower
signaling costs than low-quality firms. In our model, every firm faces the same signaling
costs, but only some firms are able to bear these costs due to their low costs of high-
4quality production. Finally, in Chisik (1998) firms have to make long-run quality choices
so they are committed to their quality level once its is chosen. In contrast, we allow firms
to choose quality in every single period of the game.
The rest of the paper is now organized as follows. The next section will introduce and
analyze the model. Then, section 3 will shortly relate the model to empirical findings in
the international marketing literature, and section 4 will briefly discuss potential
implications for international trade, location choice (or foreign direct investment) and
fiscal competition. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2. The Model
2.1 Product Quality as a Problem of Moral Hazard
Let us consider a firm that has developed a new quality level, Hq , of some existing
product category, and let us assume that it is the sole producer of the new quality level.
However, while we assume the firm to have a monopoly position for the new quality
level, let there also be a standard product of some lower quality, Lq , the market for
which is perfectly competitive.2 That means, the good under consideration can be
produced at two different quality levels, Lq  and Hq , with L Hq < q . For simplicity let D q
denote the difference between the two quality levels, i.e. D q q - qH L” . Let us
furthermore assume that the marginal cost of low-quality production is zero, while the
marginal cost of high-quality production is given by some constant Hc > 0 . Since the
market for the standard, low-quality product is assumed to be perfectly competitive the
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 Hence the model can also be interpreted as a new product monopoly in which both consumers and
producers have a given outside option.
5price is given by L Lp = c = 0 .
Consumers are assumed to have unit demand, i.e. consumers do not buy more than one
unit of the product. Furthermore, we assume a continuum of consumers which are
heterogenous in their taste for quality. More specifically, let consumers’ utility function
take the form u( q )= q - pj jQ  for j = L,H , where p  denotes the price paid. The
parameter 
Q
reflects the variation in quality taste and is assumed to be uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1.
If the product under consideration is a search good, for which product quality is perfectly
observable before purchase, a monopolist producing at a quality level of Hq  will face an
inverse demand function of x( p )= 1- ( p / q)H H D , and the monopoly price for the high-
quality good is given by:
H
M
Hp =
1
2
( q+ c )D (1)
Assuming that there are no fixed costs, the monopolist’s profits are
M
2
H
2
H
=
( q ) - 2 q c + c
4 q
P
D D
D
× (2)
Next let us consider the case of an experience good in which product quality is not
searchable ex ante, but can only be observed after purchase. That means, consumers only
learn the product’s quality after they have bought the good. Let us furthermore assume
6that quality is endogenous: Product quality is not determined once and for all by some
technology chosen, but the monopolist can choose between the two quality levels in
every single period. In this case, the producer faces an incentive to cheat consumers and
offer low quality while charging the price for a high quality good. Hence, the market may
possibly fail as Akerlof (1970) has shown in his seminal paper.
However, as is well known from standard game theory (see, e.g., Eichberger, 1993), the
problem of market failure due to asymmetric information may be overcome if the game is
repeated infinitely often and discount rates are sufficiently close to one: If consumers are
willing to pay a price premium for high-quality products and, at the same time, adopt a
boycott strategy in case of low-quality production the producer’s promise to deliver
high-quality might become self-enforcing (Telser, 1980). Let us, for example, consider
the case of a pure grim strategy according to which consumers are willing to pay Hp  as
long as the monopolist has never delivered low quality, but are only willing to offer Lp  if
the producer has ever delivered low quality. In an infinite horizon model, the monopolist
will refrain from producing low quality if the following incentive compatibility constraint
(IC) is met where i  denotes the discount rate:
H H Hp - c
i
p
1+ i
‡ (3)
The left hand side of this condition represents the present value of the profit made per
unit if the producer does not cheat and honestly produces high quality. The right hand
side gives us the discounted hold-up profit the producer makes (also per unit) for one
single time if he breaks his promise and delivers low quality while charging the price for a
7high-quality good. Since consumers will boycott him after a one time deviation, he will
be only able to charge Lp  in any period following a hold-up so that there are no further
profits to be made since L Lp = c .
If now the present value of profits from honest high-quality production as given by the
LHS of condition (3) iis greater or equal to the hold-up profit of a one time deviation as
given by the RHS, high-quality production is self-enforcing for the monopolist. That
means, it is in the monopolist’s own self-interest not to break his promise to deliver high
quality. While the price premium serves as a carrot, the boycott mechanism can be
regarded as the stick, the combination of which makes the promise self-enforcing. For
reasons of plasticity, let us rewrite the IC (3) in terms of the quality-assuring price Hp
as:
H Hp c (1+ i)‡ (3a)
If the price charged by the monopolist is lower than this quality guaranteeing price, the
IC does not hold and the monopolist’s optimal strategy is to offer low quality. However,
since payoffs are assumed to be common knowledge, consumers will not believe in the
promise of high-quality production for prices that are lower than the quality-assuring
price. Hence, consumer demand for the new quality level can now be expressed as:
H
H
H
H H
H H
x ( p )=
1 -
p
q
    for p c 1+ i)
  0      for p < c (1+ i)
D
‡
ì
í
ï
î
ï
(
(4)
8Given consumers’ strategy the producer of a high-quality experience good now faces the
following constrained maximization problem:
Hp
H H
H
H H
  ( p - c )(1 - p
q
)
s.t.    p c (1+ i)
Max
D
‡
Solving for optimal prices gives us the monopolist’s optimal pricing scheme in terms of
Hc :
H
M
H
H H
H H
p ( c ) =
c (1+ i)    for c q1+ 2i
1
2
( q+ c )  for c q1+ 2i
‡
£
ì
í
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
D
D
D
(5)
Accordingly, the inverse demand function can be expressed as a function of the
monopoly price H
Mp , and therefore also as a function of Hc . In this case, consumer
demand is given by:
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
x ( c ) =
1
2
(1 - c
q
) for q
1+ 2i c
0
1 - c
(1+ i)
q
for q
1+ i c
q
1+ 2i
for c q
1+ 2i
D
D
D
D D
D
‡ ‡
‡ ‡
‡
ì
í
ï
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
ï
0
                      (6)
Hence, the problem of market failure can be overcome if the costs of producing high
9quality are sufficiently low, or more exactly, if Hc q/(1+ i)£ D . However, if the costs of
high-quality production exceed this threshold value, the market will fail to come into
existence. In this case, the quality-assuring price exceeds consumers’ willingness to pay
so that the demand side breaks down. Furthermore, for a price lower than the quality-
assuring price consumers will not buy an alleged high-quality product since they know
that the producer’s incentive to be honest is lower than his incentive to cheat.
2.2 Product Quality as a Problem of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Up to this point we have considered a pure moral hazard problem; payoffs have been
assumed to be common knowledge. However, let us now assume that the cost of high-
quality production, Hc , is not directly observable for consumers. While consumers can
observe prices, lack of knowledge about the costs of high-quality production leaves them
uncertain about the monopolist’s payoffs, and therefore, his incentives to honestly
produce high-quality. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that there are two possible
types of monopolists, B  and G , which are characterized by their costs of high-quality
production, denoted as HBc  and HGc , respectively.
Let us also make the following two assumptions, where p  denotes the probability of a
monopolist being of type G:
(i) HB HGc q1+ i > c‡
D
 and  (ii) HGc > q
+ i
p
p
D
.
Due to assumption (i) the quality-assuring price that is incentive compatible for a type-B
10
producer exceeds consumers’ maximum willingness to pay as is shown by the demand
function (6). Hence, a type-B producer will not find it optimal to honestly produce high
quality since his costs are too high. For a type-G producer costs are sufficiently low so
that honest high-quality production is self-enforcing. However, since the quality-
guaranteeing price for a producer of type G exceeds zero, a producer of type B will now
find it profitable to pretend to be a type-G producer and earn the hold-up profit for one
time rather than to reveal his type and earn zero profits in the low-quality segment of the
market.
Assumption (ii) now implies that the prior probability distribution over the two possible
types, ( ,c ;(1 - ),c )HG HBp p , induces sufficiently pessimistic beliefs so that not a single
consumer prefers testing a new product at a quality-assuring price of Hp  over buying a
low-quality good at a price of Lp = 0 . Put differently, there is not a single price Hp  that
would make consumers try the new product and at the same time provide producers with
sufficiently high incentives to honestly deliver high quality. That means, consumers are
sufficiently pessimistic about a new product’s quality so that price cannot be used as a
signal of product quality and demand breaks down.3 Hence, under incomplete
information about the firm’s production costs the problem of market failure may return
as we imply by assumption (ii).4
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 This result is explained in Appendix 1.
4
 To overcome this problem various mechanisms have been suggested in the literature. Most prominently,
„burning money“ in form of introductory advertising (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Rogerson, 1987) or price
rebates (Shapiro, 1983) have been argued to be a credible signal for product quality. However, introductory
advertising campaigns and price rebates require large amounts of capital which might often not be available
to new firms. If firms are not able to borrow against future profits, the signaling mechanisms suggested are no
longer availbale to firms. Moreover, we rule out warranties as a quality assuring provision. First of all,
warranties might not be available due to problems of incomplete contracting, i.e. it might be too difficult to
11
2.3 Location Costs as Separation-inducing Means
Now suppose that there are two countries, E  and W , which differ with regard to the
location costs they impose on firms. More specifically, let us characterize the two
countries by the differences in country specific fixed costs which are periodically paid.
The country specific fixed costs may take the form of high taxes or wages if labor is a
fixed factor of production or if it is difficult to lay off personnel. Alternatively, one might
also think of a situation in which firms have to precommit to a fixed capacity level which
again induces a certain level of country specific costs per period. For the sake of
simplicity let us assume that the low-cost country, E , is characterized by zero fixed
costs per period5 while in the high-cost country, W , firms have to pay country specific
fixed costs of w  per period. Moreover, we assume that market exit is costly. These
market exit costs may result from compulsory layoff plans or from specific investments
associated with plant location. That means, industrial locations are subject to site or
country specificity. Let us denote these exit costs by R . Furthermore, assume that
marginal costs are dependent on the firm’s location, S , where j,Skc  stands for the
constant marginal costs to produce quality level j  with j {L, H}˛  at location S  with
S {E,W}˛  for a firm of type k  with k {B,G}˛ . Let us assume that conditions (i) and
(ii) hold for both countries, E  and W . However, note that the figure j,Skc  does not
                                                                                                                                                                  
specify all possible contingencies. Secondly, even if contracts can be contingent on any state of the world,
warranties might be costly to enforce for consumers, if courts do not work costlessly and states of the world
are difficult to verify. And finally, firms might be reluctant to give warranties if there are moral hazard
problems on the consumer side. Therefore, we want to focus on another mechanism that can help consumers
distinguishing between different types of producers. It is also worth noting that Klein and Leffler (1981),
Shapiro (1983) and Rogerson (1987) do not focus on innovating firms. In addition, brand name investments
and introductory price rebates also have the major purpose to dissipate any profit in these models as
competitive markets are not compatible with positive profits.
5
 This assumption can be viewed as analogous to the standard „laissez-faire assumption“ made in the
literature on strategic trade policy (see, e.g., Qiu 1994).
12
include location costs. Hence, the two locations can be fully described by the vectors
(0,c )j,Ek  and (w,c )j,Wk . To keep the model as simple as possible we take the countries’
location costs, 0  and w , as well as any exit costs, R , as given. The process leading to
the cost figures is not analyzed. As a first step let us also take firm locations as given, i.e.
firms cannot choose their location of production. The case of capital mobility and
location choice is analyzed in a second step.
The timing of our model is as follows: First, nature determines an innovator’s location,
S , and type, k . Then, the innovating firm learns its location and type and decides about
market entry. After buyers have observed the innovator’s location, S , the firm
announces a price for high-quality products, Hp . Now buyers can either accept the price
of Hp  or reject it and offer Lp = 0  instead.6 This basically implies that consumers
compete for the product in Bertrand fashion as it is the case in simple highest-bid
auctions: The firm sells to the highest bidders. Once the buyers have made their price
offers, the firm decides which quality to produce, Lq  or Hq , and finally, the firm decides
about market exit. If the firm does not exit, the next period starts with the firm’s price
announcement.
Let us now denote consumers’ beliefs as b (k S h )t| Ù  where th  is the history of the
game. The history of the game th  is the sequence of tuples (( p ,Q ),...,( p ,Q ))1 1 t-1 t-1  that
describes the moves of all players in periods 1,2,...,t - 1  in terms of the price, p ,
accepted/offered by consumers and the quality, Q , produced with Q {q ,q }L H˛ .
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 That means, that the price announced by the firm is basically a „take-it-or-leave-it“ offer for buyers. By this
assumption, we rule out complexities raised by bargaining issues.
13
Furthermore, all players are assumed to have perfect memory. That means, consumers’
beliefs about the firm’s type, k , are conditional upon the location of the innovating firm
and all actions observed in previous rounds of the game. While the seller precisely knows
his payoffs, buyers are ignorant about the seller’s type, i.e. his costs, and therefore also
about the seller’s payoffs. For reasons of simplicity let now H,S
GMp
 denote the optimal
price for a type-G monopolist as given by the optimal pricing scheme (5).
Then, consider the following pair of strategies where Ss  and Bs  denote the strategy of
sellers and buyers, respectively.
Ss : If the location of production is W  and nature has chosen G , always announce
H,W
GMp
 and produce high quality for buyers accepting the price. If, however, the
location of production is W  while nature has chosen B , do not enter the market
at all. In all other cases, finally, announce Lp = 0  and produce low quality.
Bs : If a seller is located at the high-cost country, buy the product for H,W
GMp
 if the
seller has never sold low quality for H,W
GMp
 and if i H,W
GMp / q
Q
D‡ . In any other case,
offer Lp = 0 .
If we now furthermore assume that producers have a lexicographic preference for
production over non-production, we can state
Proposition 1: The strategies Ss  and Bs  and the beliefs
14
b (k = G S = W ( p ,q ) hH,W,t-iGM L,t-i t| Ù ˇ  for all i = 1,...,t - 1)= 1  and
b (k = B S = E ( p ,q ) hH,W,t-iGM L,t-i t| Ú ˛  for any i = 1,...,t - 1)= 1 - p
form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies if the
following conditions hold:
w
i
p
1+ i
(1 - p
q
)H,W
GM
H,W
GM
‡
D
(7)
R
w
i
‡ (8)
w ( p - c )(1 -
p
q
)H,WGM H,WG H,W
GM
£
D
(9)
The proof is contained in Appendix 2.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows: Only a firm that can produce high-
quality products at low costs can afford paying high taxes or wages. Hence, only
monopolists of type G can „survive“ at a high-cost location. Furthermore, for a type-G
monopolist profits made by honestly selling high quality are at least as large as the profits
he makes by cheating consumers and delivering low quality while charging H,W
GMp . That
means, given consumers’ strategy a type-G monopolist will never find it attractive to
deviate from its strategy to be honest. For a type-B firm that is located at a high-cost
country, however, it is optimal not to enter the market at all since it does not make
enough profits to pay the high country specific costs. Hence, on entering the market the
15
firm would make losses. Since consumers know this by assumption they can conclude
that for every active firm at a high-cost location the promise to deliver high-quality
products is self-enforcing. In contrast, a type-B monopolist located in a low-cost country
will always find it profitable to cheat consumers. While for a type-G monopolist located
at a low-cost country the promise to deliver high quality is not less self-enforcing than
for one located at a high-cost country, the problem is that consumers are unable to
differentiate between type-G and type-B producers located in a low-cost country ex ante.
Since consumers’ beliefs are sufficiently pessimistic, they will prefer not to believe in
anybody located in a low-cost country. Hence, in equilibrium active producers in the
high-cost country will honestly deliver high quality while producers in a low-cost country
will honestly produce low-quality goods.
At a high-cost location the decision to enter the market serves as a signal for high-quality
production. While in the low-cost country both types of firms will enter and produce low
quality, in the high-cost country only type-G monopolist starts to produce and deliver
high-quality goods. Moreover, if we explicitly assume that consumers do not only form
beliefs about cost types, but directly about quality, we can reformulate Proposition 1 to
obtain a Separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Suppose consumer beliefs are given by
b(Q p S h )t| Ù Ù , i.e. consumer beliefs are not only contingent on location and the
game’s history, but the price a consumer offers as well. Then, we can state
Proposition 2: The strategies Ss  and Bs  and the beliefs
b(Q = q p = p S = W ( p ,q ) hH H,WGM H,W,t-iGM L,t-i t| Ù Ù ˇ  for all i = 1,...,t - 1)= 1
and b(Q = q p p S = E ( p ,q ) hL H,WGM H,W,t-iGM L,t-i t| „ Ú Ú ˛  for any i = 1,...,t - 1)= 1
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form a Separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies
if conditions (7), (8) and (9) hold.
Finally, let us analyze the situation where capital is mobile and firms can choose their
location of production before making the market entry decision. As location becomes a
choice variable for firms now, we reformulate the sellers’ strategy as follows:
S
_
s
: If nature has chosen G , always choose W  as the location of production, enter
the market, announce H,W
GMp , and produce high quality for buyers accepting the
price. If, however, the nature has chosen B , choose E  as the location of
production, enter the market, announce Lp = 0  and produce low quality.
We can now state
Proposition 3: The strategies S_s  and Bs  and the beliefs
b (k = G S = W ( p ,q ) hH,W,t-iGM L,t-i t| Ù ˇ  for all i = 1,...,t - 1)= 1  and
b (k = B S = E ( p ,q ) hH,W,t-iGM L,t-i t| Ú ˛  for any i = 1,...,t - 1)= 1
form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies if conditions
(7), (8) and (9) hold.
At this point it should be noted, however, that as in most signaling models multiple
equilibria may exist. Depending on consumers’ belief functions there may be pooling
equilibria as well as other separating equilibria. However, our model shows that the
location of production can be a credible signal of product quality. Furthermore, the
separating equilibrium payoff-dominates the market failure equilibrium.
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3. A short digression into the marketing literature
Indeed, empirical evidence from the marketing literature shows that a product’s country
of origin is a cue used extraordinarily often by consumers to judge product quality ex
ante. Since the 1960s several marketing studies have been conducted, most of which
found that the location of production has a significant influence on buyers’ product
evaluation. The impact a product’s origin has on demand or consumer evaluation is
commonly referred to as the country-of-origin effect. As Bilkey (1993, p. xix) has put it,
country-of-origin effects reflect „buyers’ opinions regarding the relative qualities of
goods and services produced in various countries.“ According to Tan and Farley (1987)
these country-of-origin effects represent the „most researched international aspect of
consumer behavior.“ The extensive body of empirical work on country-of-origin effects
has been reviewed by Bilkey and Nes (1982), Özsomer and Cavusgil (1991) and, more
recently, Peterson and Jolibert (1995). In general, the studies have found that consumers
have different perceptions about products made in different countries. The most salient
finding is that consumers use a product’s location of production to evaluate its quality ex
ante. This is also reflected in consumers’ willingness to pay. To give an example, in an
empirical marketing study Johannson and Nebenzahl (1986) found that consumers in
their sample were willing to pay 14 per cent more for a Buick built in Germany compared
to one manufactured in the US while they were willing to pay 16.4 per cent less for a
Buick made in Mexico (compared to the US). Similar findings were obtained for other
cars as well as VCRs and microwaves (see Nebenzahl and Jaffe, 1993).
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4. Possible Implications for International Trade and Location Choice
Concerning international trade flows our model would predict that high-cost countries
export high-quality products while importing search (or heavily standardized) goods as
well as low-quality experience goods. The opposite should then be true for low-cost
countries.7 Hence, our model can give a new reason for intra-industry trade as trade
flows are determined by informational product differentiation.
Moreover, the few models that discuss informational asymmetries between firms and
consumers and focus on the question of how these asymmetries may affect international
trade, i.e. W. Mayer (1984) and Bagwell and Staiger (1989), treat product quality as
exogenous. Therefore, the policy conclusions one might derive from these models are
quite different from ours. In W. Mayer’s model the optimal trade policy consists in an
export subsidy that induces foreign consumers to try the product. Similarly, Bagwell and
Staiger (1989) argue that a quality contingent tax/subsidy program might be welfare
enhancing on the national level. In contrast, almost the opposite is true for our model:
Not subsidies, but high country specific costs such as taxes can indirectly signal product
quality.
If capital is mobile and plant locations are endogenous the model might also provide a
new rationale for firms’ location choice. Firms that have low costs for providing high-
quality products might consciously choose a high-cost country for production instead of
                                                       
7
 Interestingly enough, Vernon (1966) has made a very similar point. As in our model, Vernon addresses the
question of where new and where more standardized products are produced. His finding is that new products
are usually produced in advanced countries, while more standardized goods are usually produced in less
developed countries where labor is cheap. While Vernon bases his finding on a completely different
explanation, it is interesting to notice that his results could also be explained by our model assuming that new
products rather have experience qualities while standardized products can be regarded as search goods.
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a low-cost location - even if there is no difference in the level of public goods or
infrastructure provided. To be more precisely, location at a high-cost country might
serve as a signal of product quality exactly because of the fact that the high-cost country
does not offer any direct productivity benefits. That means, firms may settle at high-cost
locations purely for signaling considerations.
A very similar point has been raised by Bagwell and Staiger (1988) who consider a
market entry game similar to the models of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Bagwell
and Ramey (1988). According to their model, multinational firms might locate plants in
high-cost countries to signal their production costs to rival firms. To put it differently, in
the model of Bagwell and Staiger (1988) location choice can be used strategically to
change rivals’ perceptions about the firm’s production costs. However, the role the
location of production may have as a signal for product quality is not explored in their
model.
Country-of-origin labels may be especially relevant as a signaling device if firms cannot
sink enormous amounts of resources to gain credibility as has been suggested by Klein
and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983). Introductory advertising campaigns or price
rebates require large amounts of capital which might often not be available to new firms.8
Hence, in the presence of capital market constraints firms might have to use other signals
and might rather use the country-of-origin as a signaling device since it does not require
tremendous amounts of start-up capital to be sunken to gain credibility. Instead the firm
                                                       
8
 Explanations for the presence of capital constraints are beyond the scope of this paper. However, capital
constraints have been reported to exist - especially for new firms (see, e.g., C. Mayer, 1988).
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leases the country’s brand name, „Made in Country XY“, and periodically pays a
franchise royalty in form of high taxes or wages. In this case, location choice can be
interpreted as the conclusion of an implicit franchise contract between the firm and the
host country or its representatives, i.e. the government. According to this interpretation
host countries (or governments) act as franchisors that rent out their brand name (e.g.,
„Made in Germany“) to firms. Country specific expenditures can now be seen as
franchise royalties producers have to pay for using the brand name. In contrast to
ordinary franchise contracts, however, there are no initial capital requirements, but a
nondissipative exit cost bond which serves as a termination penalty. Quite interestingly,
Bagwell and Staiger (1988) report that according to the empirical findings of
Swedenborg (1979) Swedish multinationals are in fact more likely to invest in countries
characterized by comparatively high wage rates.
In this context, our model might also offer a new perspective on tax competition and
location tournaments. Lowering taxes, relaxing environmental standards and granting
subsidies to new firms might not necessarily attract new firms if it is the higher costs
associated with a country that helps the firm signaling its products’ quality. Building
upon this rationale location tournaments might not necessarily result in destructive tax
competition and subsidy races or social and environmental „dumping“. Starting from our
model one might think of scenarios in which both high-cost and low-cost locations might
coexist. While firms in high-tax countries will then rather produce high-quality
experience goods firms in low-tax countries will produce search goods and low-quality
experience goods (assumed that all other things are equal and that there is a demand for
such goods). In a general equilibrium approach, a country’s optimal tax policy will be
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dependent on the structure of demand for high- and low-quality experience goods as well
as on the demand for search goods (where signaling devices do not play a role).
Moreover, an additional factor that determines a country’s optimal tax policy consists in
the degree of competition for capital between governments, i.e. the structure of the
„franchise market“. That means, the optimal tax policy is also dependent of the strategies
of other countries. To derive hard conclusions about optimal tax policy in this context,
however, further research is needed. While we have to leave the questions raised
unanswered right now, we hope that they may stimulate further research in this
direction.9
Finally, it should be noted, however, that the analysis is strictly applicable only to new
products whose quality is unknown before purchase. The model says little about the
location choice of multinational enterprises which already have an established brand
name. In this case, the analysis of Wernerfelt (1988) might apply according to which a
monopolist can use umbrella branding to signal product quality. That means, by using the
brand name of an established product for a new product a multiproduct monopolist can
put its entire reputation at stake. Later sales of other products that wear the same brand
as the new product serve as a bond and nondissipative signal of product quality.
However, for umbrella branding to work as a signal, one has to assume that the firm
already enjoys a reputation which it can post as a bond. In contrast, our analysis might
apply to the case in which the firm does not already have a favorable reputation it can put
                                                       
9
 The works of Bond and Samuelson (1986) and Raff and Srinivasan (1998) are somewhat related as they
explore how a country’s tax policy might be used to send signals about local production costs to foreign
investors. However, they do not explorehow a firm’s location choice might affect consumer beliefs and,
thereby, demand.
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at stake.
5. Conclusion
This paper has endeavored to offer an additional reason for intra-industry trade. If firms
can choose the quality they wish to produce, and consumers find it difficult to determine
product quality before purchase, the location of production can signal product quality
under certain conditions, and thereby affect international trade flows. According to the
model presented here, intra-industry trade in vertical differentiated experience goods can
be determined by information asymmetries about product quality.
The model also provides an explanation for the empirically observed, but in economic
theory widely neglected phenomenon that consumers judge a product’s quality by its
location of production. According to the model presented here high country specific
costs such as high taxes or wages and compulsory exit costs might serve as a „natural“
screening device that enables consumers to differentiate between firms that can produce
high-quality goods at low costs and for which the promise to deliver high quality is self-
enforcing and those firms that find it profitable to „hold up“ consumers. If the „Made-in“
label is used as a signal for product quality, trade flows may be determined by country-
of-origin effects. According to our theory high-cost countries would now rather export
high-quality experience goods while importing low-quality experience goods and search
goods while the opposite should hold for low-cost countries.
Furthermore, we have argued that, in contrast to much of the recent trade literature, not
a subsidy, but high location costs such as high taxes might help a firm in its endeavors to
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signal product quality. Moreover, if capital is at least mobile to some degree and plant
locations endogenous, the model also gives a new rationale for location choice and
foreign direct investment: Firms that can produce high quality at low costs might
consciously chose high-cost locations for production as a means to signal product
quality. Location choice can now be seen as analogous to the conclusion of a franchise
contract: The country (or its representatives) rent out the country’s brand name („Made
in Country XY“) for which they periodically receive a franchise royalty which is usually
called tax in this context. Contrary to standard franchise contracts, however, we have
emphasized on the role of exit costs which allow to waive initial capital requirements.
Proceeding from this hypothesis we have finally suggested that intergovernmental
competition and location tournaments do not necessarily have to result in cut-throat tax
competition, subsidy races and the lowering of social and environmental standards as the
standard literature on international public finance argues. While we have only explored
some possible implications of our model so far, we hope that the questions raised might
stimulate further research into this direction.
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Appendix 1: Explanation of Assumption (ii)
Assumption (ii) implies that not a single consumer is willing to try a new product of
unknown quality. This result can be easily verified by comparing a consumer’s payoff
from trying a new product with the certain payoff of buying a low-quality product. Due
to assumption (i) it is optimal to deliver high quality for a type-G producer while it is a
dominant strategy to cheat for a producer of type B. Now given the prior probability
distribution, ( ,c ;(1 - ),c )HG HBp p , as well as consumers’ grim strategy as described above,
for any particular Hp  a consumer’s payoff from trying a new product can be expressed
as
p p
Q Q QH H L H Lq - p
i
+(1 - )( q - p
1+ i
+
q
i(1+ i) )
Compared to the certain payoff from buying low quality, Q Lq /i , the condition for trying
the new product reduces to
Q
D
‡
( + i) p
q(1+ i)
Hp
p
.
As can be seen from this condition, demand will be zero for Hp ( q(1+ i)) / ( + i)‡ p pD .
Since we know from condition (3a) that producers only deliver a high-quality product
and consumers only buy a product of allegedly high quality if H HGp c (1+ i)‡ , this can be
reduced to HGc ( q) / ( + i)‡ p pD   which is, of course, assumption (ii).
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Appendix 2: Proof of the Proposition
First, we must proof that given consumers’ strategy, Bs , and their beliefs, b (k S h )t| Ù ,
neither an innovator of type B nor one of type G can gain by deviation from his specified
strategy, Ss , at any stage of the game. Second, we have to show that consumers’
strategies are optimal given Ss , and finally, consumer beliefs must be consistent with
equilibrium strategies and observed actions.
Ia) Suppose an innovator is located at W  and nature has chosen B . As implied by
assumption (i) and consumers’ utility function, consumers are not willing to pay type B’s
quality-assuring price, H H,SBp = c (1+ i) . That means, the one-time hold-up profit exceeds
type B’s gains from honestly providing high quality as implied by condition (3). Since the
firm is located at the high-cost country its net profit on entering the market and cheating
consumers is given by
H,W
GM
H,W
GMp
1+ i
(1 p
q
) w
i
- -
D
, if the firm produces low quality and does not exit
afterwards, and
H,W
GM
H,W
GMp
1+ i
(1 p
q
) w
1+ i
R
1+ i
- - -
D
, if the firm produces low quality and exits
afterwards.
The first expression cannot be positive because of condition (7) which states that w / i
exceeds the maximum profit any producer could make on a one-time deviation.
26
Furthermore, due to condition (8) the maximum profit from deviating one single time and
exiting the market afterwards is zero as well. Thus, the second expression is also non-
positive. Therefore, we can conclude that for a type-B producer located at the high-cost
country it is optimal not to enter the market.
Ib) Now let us still assume that a firm is located at the high-cost country, but nature has
chosen G . By honestly producing high quality the type-G monopolist can earn a profit
stream of ( - w) / iP  with P D= ( p - c )(1 - p / q )H,WGM H,WG H,WGM , which in this case is positive
due to condition (9). From (Ia) we already know that cheating consumers while being
located at a high-cost country implies losses (which is independent from the firm’s type).
Hence, a type-G monopolist located at W  will find it optimal not to deviate, but to
honestly produce high quality.
Ic) Suppose now that an innovator of any type is located at E . Given consumers’
strategy and beliefs they will reject any price other than Lp = 0  due to assumption (ii).
Hence, for firms located at the low-cost country it is optimal to produce low quality.
II) Now, we have shown that for innovators of type B it is only optimal to enter the
market and to produce if they are located at the low-cost country. For innovators of type
G, however, it is optimal to enter the market in any case. Nevertheless, as has been
shown under (I) it is only optimal to produce high quality for the firm if its location is the
high-cost country. Obviously, for consumers it is then optimal to accept H,W
GMp
 if the seller
is located at W , given sellers’ strategies and i H,W
GMp / q
Q
D‡ . On the contrary, given the
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probability distribution ( ,c ;(1 - ),c )HG HBp p  as specified by assumption (ii) no consumers
will find it optimal to sample a new product if the firm is located in the low-cost country
as has been explained in the text. Since both type-B and type-G producers enter the
market if they are located in the low-cost country consumers cannot distinguish between
them and will optimally refrain from accepting any price higher than Lp = 0 .
III) Finally, consumers’ beliefs are consistent with equilibrium strategies, since every
innovator that is located a the high-cost location and has entered the market will be of
type G. Hence, the very fact that a firm located at W  takes up production credibly
signals consumers that its promise to produce high quality is self-enforcing. In contrast,
at the low-cost country every firm will enter the market. Therefore, a proportion 1- p  of
the firms located at the low-cost site will be of type B, and accordingly, a proportion p
of type G. Thus, consumers beliefs are reinforced by equilibrium outcomes. 
.
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